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Perception, Action and Reaction: 
A Comparative Analysis of Decision-Making Processes 
in Bilateral Conflicts 
A.BRAHAM BEN-ZVI 
Tel-Aviv University 
In recent years, the recognition that decision makers in foreign policy 
act "in accordance with their perception of reality , not in response to 
reality itself," 1 has permeated the vastly expanding literature on the role 
of perception in international relations. A common denominator in these 
studies is the discovery that perception and cognition intervene between 
the individual decision maker and his objective environment, and there-
fore the decisions he makes about his environment are subjective. 2 The 
conclusion that every decision maker in foreign policy operates within 
the context of psychological predispositions which function as the screen 
throu gh which external information passes and is assimilat ed, implies a 
serious potential for misperception and distortion of incoming stimuli. 
And indeed, a number of theoretical studies illustrate that, in attempting 
to fit new data into pre-existing theories and convictions, decision makers 
might ignore, reinterpret or reconstruct all pieces of information which 
do not initially conform. 3 
Against this background of mounting preoccupation with perceptions 
as a determining factor of foreign policy decisions, the present study 
concentrates on the perception of historical events. Seeking to compre-
hend the impact which certain recent historical events, or chains of 
events, had in shaping the perceptions of the present, this article exam-
ines whether and to what extent policy makers are predisposed to see 
the present in the light of the past and to predict the future on this basis, 
and whether they are liable to treat any partial resemblance between 
two entities as a whole or exact correspondence. 4 
1 Michael Brecher, The Foreign Policy System of Israel: Setting, Images, Process 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), p. 12. 
2 Herbert Simon, "Theories of Decision-Making and Behavioral Science," Ameri-
can Economic Review, XXXI (June 1959), p. 271; Kenneth E. Boulding, "National 
Images and Int ernati onal Systems," The Journal of Confiict Resolution, III (June 
1959), pp. 120-121. 
3 See, for example, Ole R. Holsti, "Cognitive Dynamics and Images of the Enemy: 
Dulles and Russia," in David J. Finlay, et al., Enemies in Politics (Chicago: Rand 
McNally, 1967), pp. 25-36; and Abraham Ben-Zvi, "American Preconceptions and 
Policies Toward Japan, 1940-1941," International Studies Quarterly, XIX (June 
1975), p. 230. 
4 David H. Fischer, Historians' Fallacies (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), p. 
247; Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 240. 
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Specifically, two sets of crises will be juxtaposed. First, American per-
ceptions of Japan's military capabilities and intentions toward the United 
States during the period preceding the Pearl Harbor attack will be con-
trasted to the perceptions operating during the final phases of the Pa-
cific War. Then Israeli perceptions of Arnb capabilities and intentions 
on the eve of the Six-Day War of June 1967 will be compared to those 
prior to the outbreak of the Yorn Kippur War of October 1973. Thus, 
the focus of this analysis is on the question of the extent to which the 
perception of the power relationships with the adversary held by mem-
bers of the high policy elite changed as a result of the previous encoun-
ter. 15 What was the nature of the '1earning experience" which American 
and Israeli policy makers underwent as a result of their involvement in 
the previous crisis? Was the experience of the prior debacle or triumph 
perceived as relevant to the new situation at hand? And finally: were 
the decision makers of the United States and Israel oblivious to the 
varieties and complexities of the past, to the tentativeness of most his-
torical reconstructions, and to the many hazards associated with claim-
ing that one occurrence is '1ike" another? 6 
1. THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN: 1941-45 
Perceptions prior to the Pacific War 
American policy toward Japan during the months preceding Pearl 
Harbor was not formulated by a single cohesive group of decision 
makers, but rather it was the outcome of competition among divergent 
groups enjoying varying degrees of power, which sought conflicting 
goals and advocated contrary courses or action. However, one group 
appears to have played a dominant role during most of the "decision 
games" prior to the outbreak of the Pacific War. This group included 
Secretary of War (from July 1940) Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of the 
Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Jr., and Stanley K. Hornbeck, political 
adviser to the State Departm ent.7 
In 1940 and 1941, these American officials advocated a fum, uncom-
promising policy line toward Japan, strongly supporting the imposition 
of increasingly comprehensive economic sanctions to deter Japanese ex-
pansion toward the south and thereby to reduce the threat of a Pacific 
6 See, in this connection: David M. Lampton, "The U. S. Image of Peking in 
Three International Crises," Western Political Quarterly, XXIV (March 1973), p. 29. 
6 Fischer, Historians' Fallacies, p. 247. See also, in this connection: Ernest R. May, 
"Lessons" af the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. xiii; see also Robert Jervis, "Hypo -
theses on Misperception," World Politics, XX ( April 1968) , p. 472; Stanley Hoff-
mann, Gulliver's Troubles, or the Setting of American Foreign Policy (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1968 ), pp. 135-139. 
7 Ben-Zvi, "American Preconceptions and Policies," passim. 
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confrontation. They surmised that, impressed by the U. S. firm deter-
mination, and deprived of some of her most vital necessities, Japan would 
yield and succumb to the stick of economic pressure and consequently 
adopt a more conciliatory policy toward the United States. 8 
In the words of Stimson and Bundy: 
Since 1937, when the Japanese attacked China, Stimson had been 
urging . . . an embargo on all American trade with Japan, and this 
attitude he canied with him into the Cabinet. Recognizing the 
peril of a premature showdown with Japan, he nevertheless be-
lieved that the effect of an embargo would be to check and weaken 
the Japanese, rather than to drive them into open war. 9 
The premise behind the view that "firmness rather than cajolery would 
be necessary to stay the Japanese hand" 10 was that "the Japanese, how-
ever wicked their intentions, would have the good sense not to get in-
volved in war with the United States." 11 Thus it was assumed that Japan 
was anxious to avoid war at all costs and that, if confronted with a 'bold 
and positive American policy" to cut off supplies of raw materials, she 
would act in a responsible, restrained manner. 
Stimson, Morgenthau and Hornbeck from time to time referred to past 
experiences to support the premise that only a demonstration of resolute-
ness on the part of the United States could preserve peace and deter the 
aggressor. On October 4, 1940, Stimson drafted an "Historical Memo-
randum as to Japan's Relations with the U. S., which may have a bear-
ing upon the present situation." At a Cabinet meeting of the same day 
he elaborated: 
In the autumn of 1919, President Wilson got his dander up and put 
an embargo on all the cotton going to Japan and a boycott on her 
silk with the result that she crawled down within two months and 
brought all her troops out from Siberia like whipped puppies. 12 
The implications of the "historical lessons" were clear: Just as economic 
sanctions proved to be an effective weapon against Japan in 1919, they 
would again be effective in 1940 and 1941. 
s Chihiro Hosoya, "Miscalculations in Deterrent Policy: Japanese-U. S. Relations, 
1938-41," Journal af Peace Research, V ( 1968), passim; Norman A. Graebner, 
"Hoover, Roosevelt and the Japanese," in Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto 
(eds.), Pearl Harbor as History ( New York: Columbia University Press, 1973), p. 42. 
9 Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War, 
Vol. II (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948), p. 384. 
10 Elting E. Morison, Turmoil and Tradition: A Study of the Life and Times af 
HenrtJ L. Stimson (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1960), p 522. 
11 Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, p. 385. 
12 Quoted in Hosoya, "Miscalculations in Deterrent Policy," p. lll. The back-
ground of the crisis included an increase in the size of the Japanese expeditionary 
forces in Siberia in 1918. 
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Similarly, Morgenthau used to resort to the '1essons of Munich" to 
justify firmness in the Pacific. Referring to the proposed formulas for a 
modus vivendi agreement between the U. S. and Japan, he observed : 
o matter what explanation is offered to the public of a "truce" with 
Japan, the American people, the Chinese people, and the oppresse d 
peoples of Europe, as well as those forces in Britain and in Russia 
who are with us in this fight, will regard it as a confession of Ameri-
can weakness, and vacillation. How else can the world possibly in-
terpret a relaxation of the economic pressure ... when that relaxa-
tion is undertaken not because Japan has actually abandone d 
[aggression] but only because she promises not to extend her agres-
sive acts to other countries? The parallel with Munich is inescap-
able.13 
During the period preceding the Pacific War, then, most American 
policy makers overlooked the possibility that the enemy was not neces-
sarily guided by a similar train of thought. Unable to supersede the cul-
tural boundaries separating them from the conceptual world of the ir 
opponent, they strongly believed that in light of the disparity in military 
capabilities between Japan and the U. S. (which they greatly exagger-
ated), the Japanese would decide whether or not to attack the U. S. on 
a strictly rational basis-and consequently would not favor war. Igno-
rance of the psychology of the Japanese people ( and especially of 
middle echelon officers) prevented them from perceiving the Japane se 
predisposition, at crucial moments, to give priority to nationalistic, ide-
ological and psychological factors over purely military ones, and con-
sequently to make high-risk decisions: 
The economic sanctions, rather than serving as a 'deterrent to a 
southern advance,' produced precisely the opposite effect. . . . A 
complete embargo, rather than resulting in Japan's submission, car-
1ied with it the danger of driving Japan to a military advance into 
the south in spite of the resulting possibility of a war with the U. S. 
. . . The enforcement of . . . economic sanctions thus turned out to 
stiffen the attitude of the middle echelon officers and provoked them 
to execute the plan for a southern advance. . . . The oil embargo 
also caused the middle echelon officers in the Army to move towar d 
favoring going quickly to war with the U. S.14 
13 This quotation is cited from a draft of a personal letter to the President, which 
Morgenthau never sent. As the various schemes for a modus vivendi did not lead to 
an agreement, there was no need for Morgenthau to send his letter warning against 
such a truce. See: Morgenthau's letter (undated), pp. 1-2, in Henry Morgenthau's 
Diary , Book 4, March-December 31, 1941, Roosevelt Library. 
14 Hosoya, "Miscalculations in Deterrent Policy," p. 111. 
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Committed to its preconceived "rational" model of the adversary's be-
havior, the group of "hard liners" discounted the spate of messages sent 
by the American Ambassador in Toyko, Joseph Grew, on the eve of 
Pearl Harbor, warning against the assumption that continued economic 
sanctions would automatically force Japan into adopting a restrained 
policy the U. S. Similarly Stimson, Morgenthau and Hornbeck remained 
oblivious to the bulk of intercepted messages originating in Tokyo in 
November 1941, which indicated that the Japanese were about to launch 
a southeastern campaign during the weekend of November 30 or the 
weekend of December 7. Once the last-ditch attempt to bring the Hull· 
Nomura conversations to a successful conclusion was found "to be in 
vain" ( following the uncompromising "Ten Point Plan" which Secretary 
of State Cordell Hull submitted to the Japanese Ambassador in Wash-
ington, Kichisaburo Nomura on November 26), it became clear from 
these intercepted messages that war with the United States ( or with 
Britain) was indeed imminent. Indeed, the plethora of messages origi-
nating in Tokyo after November 26 made clear that Japan had finally 
abandoned the political option, but that it wished to deceive the United 
States into believing that it still desired the diplomatic dialogue to con-
tinue.15 
Despite the mounting reliable warning signals, several U. S. policy 
makers remained, almost to the very end, committed to their belief that 
Japan would not dare to directly challenge the U. S. in the Pacific. (It 
was expected that Japan would strike at a British, Dutch or French tar-
get in the Pacific, but would refrain from attacking American territory.) 
Thus when John Emmerson ( a junior embassy officer in Tokyo) warned 
the State Department that Japan might launch an attack out of sheer 
desperation, he was rebuked by Hornbeck who replied: "Tell me of one 
case in history when a nation went to war out of desperation ." 16 
In conjunction with their tendency to overestimate their own military 
capabilities, members of Washington's high policy elite were predis-
posed, through much of the 1930's, to underestimate Japan's military 
capabilities as well as production capacity: 
Too often American observers of the Japanese army saw only the 
stereotypes they had carried in their heads from the United States, 
not the real Japanese army. Japanese bayonet training, for example, 
was reported to be merely an adaptation of traditional Japanese 
15 Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1962) , p. 200. 
16 Quoted in Chihiro Hosoya, "Characteristics of the Foreign Policy Decision-
Making System in Japan," World Politics, XXVI (April 1974), p. 353. 
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techniques of the sword and therefore surely unsuited for combat 
against Wes tern annies.17 
In conclusion, during the period preceding the outbreak of the Pacific 
War, most U. S. policy makers remained oblivious to the asymetry of 
motivation that existed between themselves and the Japanese leade rs. 
As a result, they failed to perceive the possibility that their oppone nt 
( whose military capabilities were consistently underestimated), might be 
willing to accept greater costs and risks than expected. 18 
Perceptions during the last phase of the Pacific War 
Whereas Henry Morgenthau lost his easy access to the White House 
following the death of President Roosevelt in April 1945 and was soon 
allowed to retire, 19 Henry Sitmson, who shared his conceptions of Japan 
in 1940 and 1941, was retained in his position as Secretary of War in 
President Truman's new Cabinet. 
Among the areas which Stimson considered essential to the securi ty 
of the U. S. in 1945 was the Pacific Ocean, including those Pacific islands 
captured from Japan. Hoping that the Soviet Union would not interfe re 
with this network scheme, but rather act as a stabilizing force in the 
Pacific, he envisaged no postwar role for Japan in the region .20 Inste ad, 
the notion that Japan was an "absolute enemy" dominated his thinking . 
Evidently, the traumatic failure of Stimson's deterrent strategy of 1941 21 
fundamentally shattered his perception of Japanese policy makers as ra -
tional statesmen, whose decisions and actions were guided by realis tic 
calculations. Oversimplifying and exaggerating the '1essons" of Pearl 
Harbor, he advocated, during the closing stages of the Pacific War, poli-
cies which sharply and fundamentally differed from those he recom-
mended forty months earlier .22 
That Stimson's image of Japan had undergone a profound change fol-
lowing the outbreak of war is evidenced by his perceptions of the mag-
nitude and scope of the Japanese threat to the Western Hemisphe re in 
17 Russell F. Weighley, "The Role of the War Department and the Army," Pearl 
Harbor as History, p. 186. 
18 Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor, p. 354; Abraham Ben-Zvi, "Hindsight and Fore-
sight: A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of Surprise Attacks," World Politics, 
XXVIll (April 1976), p. 394. 
10 May, "Lessons" of the P8St, p. 20. 
20 Akira lriye, The Cold War in Asia (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1974 ), 
p . 99. 
21 Alexander L. George, David K. Hall and William E. Simons, The Limits of 
Coercive Diplomacy (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), p. 245. See also, in this connec-
tion, Jervis, "Hypotheses on Misperception," p. 470. 
22 See, in this connection: Saadia Touval, Domestic Dynamics of Change from 
Confrontation to Accommodation Policies, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1973), p. 17; Jervis, Perception a11d Misperception, pp . 271-308. 
PERCEPTION, AcnoN AND REA.cnoN 101 
I942. Greatly overrating Japan's military capabilities and propensity to 
take high-risk decisions, he was "principally interested in the P.anama 
Canal," which he considered a likely target for a Japanese strike. 23 The 
same proclivity to overestimate Japanese capabilities as well as determi-
nation to fight to the very end was clearly manifested in July 1945, when 
Stimson assumed that "there was a strong possibility ,that the Japanese 
Government might determine upon resistance to the end, in all the areas 
of the Far East under its control." 24 In such an event," he surmised, "the 
Allies would be faced with the enormous task of destroying an am1ed 
force of five million men and five thousand suicide aircraft, belonging 
to a race which had already amply demonsh·ated its ability to fight lit-
erally to the death." 25 In the words of a memorandum Stimson submit-
ted to the President on July 2, 1945: 
If we once land on one of the main islands and begin a forceful 
occupation of Japan, we shall probably have cast the die of last-
ditch resistance. The Japanese are highly patriotic and certainly 
susceptible to calls for fanatical resistance to repel an invasion. Once 
started in actual invasion, we shall in my opinion have to go through 
with an even more bitter finish fight than in Germany. 26 
This radical change in Stimson's perception of Japanese intentions was 
of the utmost importance as it led him to advocate the use of the recently 
developed atomic bomb as a means for ending the war quickly, thereby 
preventing a "very long, costly and arduous struggle," 27 which would 
have followed the planned landing in Kyushu: 
I felt that to extract a genuine surrender from the Emperor and his 
military advisers, they must be administered a tremendous shock 
which would carry convincing proof of our power to destroy the 
Empire . Such an effective shock would save many times the number 
of lives, both American and Japanese, than it would cost.28 
Considered irrational and recalcitrant, "the Japanese ruling oligarchy" 29 
was not expected to be impressed either by a display of the atomic bomb, 
or by an explicit ultimatum divulging the nature of the new weapon. 
Thus, the actual deployment of the bomb had become, in Stimson's eyes, 
the only possible means to bring the war to a rapid close. Since the 
23 Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, Vol. II, p. 406. 
24 Ibid., p. 618. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid., p. 621. 
21 Ibid., p. 620. 
28 Ibid., p. 617. See also: Herbert Feis, The Atomic Bomb and the End of World 
War II (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 47. 
29 Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, p. 625. 
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planned invasion was perceived as too costly and the demonstration of 
atomic energy ineffective, Stimson felt that a "most dramatic and shock-
ing disclosure of the new force" was needed. "Any other course," he rea-
soned, "involved selious danger to the major objective of obtaining a 
prompt surrender from the Japanese." 30 As Morison points out " .. . tak-
ing all things together it is reasonable to suppose that the Secretary of 
War was, in the first months of 1945, acting within a developing assump-
tion that the bomb would be used." 31 
Faced with conflicting military evaluations, Stimson assimilated those 
bits of information which coincided with and supported his preconcei ved 
notions. Therefore, in defiance of the assessments included in the Stra-
tegic Bombing Survey, which predicted that Japan would "in all proba-
bility" surrender prior to November 1, 1945,32 he expected fanatical and 
fierce Japanese resistance to last until the late fall of 1946. 33 
Concurrently, the Secretary of War did not attach much importa nce 
to the available evidence which, in the spring and early summer of 1945, 
indicated that the Emperor and other Japanese leaders were actively 
seeking a way to end the fighting. By early July, the U. S. had inter-
cepted messages between Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo and the 
Japanese Ambassador in Moscow, Naotake Sato, which showed tha t the 
Emperor had taken a personal hand in the matter and had directe d that 
the Soviet Union be asked to help terminate the war .34 As Togo advised 
Sato on July 12, 
His Majesty is extremely anxious to terminate the war as soon as 
possible. . . . Our government therefore desires to negotiate for a 
speedy restoration of peace. . . . For this purpose Prince Konoye 
will proceed to Moscow with a persona l message from the Emperor 
and it is requested that the Soviet Government kindly provi de him 
with travel facilities. 85 
The diary of Secretary of the Navy, James Forrestal, provides a clear 
illustration of the extent of the information available in Washingt on in 
30 Gar Alperovitz, Atvmic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam (New York : Vin-
tage Press, 1965), p. 116. 
31 Morison, Turmoil and Tradition, p. 629. 
32 Hanson W. Baldwin, Great ,Mistakes of the War (London: Alvin Redma n, 
1950), p. 91. 
33 Feis, The Atvmic Bvmb, p. 70. See also, in this connection: Alperovitz, Atomic 
Diplomacy, p . 108; Louis Morton, "The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb," Foreign 
Affairs, XXXV (January 1957), p. 339. 
84 Alperovitz, Atomic Diplomacy, p. 108. Morton, "The Decision to Use the Atomic 
Bomb," pp. 343-344. 
B~ Quoted in John Toland, The Rising Sun (New York: Random House, 1970 ), 
pp. 757-758. See also: Robert J. S. Butow, Japan's Decision to Surrender (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1954), p. 130. Konoye's visit to Moscow never took place 
as a result of Soviet procrastination and eventual declaration of war on Japan. 
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July regarding the Emperor's strong desire to bring the Pacific War to 
a speedy end: 
Messages today [July 15] on Japanese-Russian conversations. Togo, 
Foreign Minister, insisted that Sato present to Molotov the request 
of the Emperor himself. Sato's replies insistingly pointed out the 
lack of reality in Togo's apparent belief that there is a chance of 
persuading Russia to take independent action on the Eastern war. 
He stated very bluntly and without any coating how fantastic is the 
hope that Russia would be impressed by Japanese willingness to 
give up territory which she had already lost .... Throughout Sato's 
message ran a note of cold and realistic evaluation of Japan's posi-
tion; and he said that the situation was rapidly passing beyond the 
point of Japan's and Russia's cooperating in the security of Asia but 
[ that the question was] rather whether there would be any Man-
chukuo or even Japan itself left as entities. The gist of his final mes-
sage was that it was clear that Japan was thoroughly and completely 
defeated and that the only course open was quick and definite ac-
tion recognizing such fact. ... 36 
The mere fact that the Japanese had approached the Soviet Union with 
a request for mediation ( combined with the continuous efforts of several 
Japanese diplomats in Berne and Stockholm to establish channels of com-
munications with the American OSS organization in Europe) should 
have suggested the possibility that, for all her talk about "death to the 
last man," Japan might have accepted the Allied demand for uncondi-
tional surrender: 
... if only it were couched in more specific terms than those which 
Washington was already using to define its meannig. . . . What 
Japan needed was a positive, not a negative, definition of terms, 
with special emphasis, of course, on the future of Japan's imperial 
house.37 
No such definitions, however, were forthcoming. Indeed, none of the 
bits of reliable information about the peace feelers could convince mem-
bers of the high policy elite to reexamine their convictions. 38 Stimson 
86 Walter Millis, ed., The FQTTestal Diaries ( New York: The Viking Press, 1951), 
p. 75. 
87 Butow, Japan's Decision to Surrender, p. 134 (italics Butow's). See also Toshi-
kozu Kase, Jo·umey to the Missouri (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), p. 
193. 
38 Baldwin, Great Mistakes <Yf the War, p. 90. See also, in this connection, Mor-
ton, "The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb," p. 343; and Toland, The Rising Sun, p. 
770. According to Toland, in late July "the American leaders, now in possession of 
the ultimate weapon, were already determined to accept nothing short of uncondi-
tional surrender, and were no longer capable of considering negotiations even as 
the most peace-minded Japanese saw them" (p. 770). 
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therefore remained firm in his belief that the Japanese approach to Mos-
cow was " ... no indication of any weakening in the Japanese determi-
nation to fight rather than accept unconditional sun-ender," 39 and that 
the purpose of the desperate Japanese pleas for Soviet mediation "were 
aimed at retaining impo1tant conquered areas." 40 Greatly overestimating 
Japan's military capabilities and will to fight,41 he was afraid lest any 
softening in the sun-ender terms be interpreted by "at least some of 
Japan's leaders ... as the first proof of that American fatigue which 
[Japanese militarists] had been predicting since 1941." 42 
In conclusion, there can be little doubt that the lessons derived from 
the trauma of Pearl Harbor and from the apparent bankmptcy of the 
dominant prewar perception of the Japanese "operational code" led Stim-
son to adopt, in 1945, a posture derived from a fundamentally different 
premise. Adhe1ing to clear-cut, sharply delineated and dichotomou s 
views, he was thus unable to anticipate either the possibility that in 1941 
the Japanese might make "an all-out , do-or-die attempt, actually risking 
Hara-Kiri, to make Japan impervious to economic embargoes abroa d, 
rather than yield to foreign pressures," or the possibility that Japan 
might, in 1945, prefer sun-ender to utter destruction ( assuming that the 
Imperial House would be preserved). 
2. THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT: 1967-1973 
Israeli perceptions on the eve of the Six-Day War, 1967 
An examination of the predominant Israeli perceptions of the opponen t 
on the eve of the Six-Day War of June 1967, indicates that these were 
shaped by the mem01y and impact of an acute national trauma, namely 
the destruction of European Jewry during the Second World War. 
Whereas the "hard-liners" had remained oblivious, throughout the fall 
of 1941, to the danger of a direct Japanese attack on American terri-
tory, Israeli policy makers tended to view the unfolding crisis of May 
1967 with utmost concern, fearing that it might escalate and hence pose 
a threat to the very existence of their state. 
In analyzing the predominant images which, with varying degrees of 
intensity, affected the actions of such Israeli decision makers as Prime 
Minister Levi Eshkol, Foreign Minister Abba Eban and Minister of 
Transportation Moshe Carmel during the crisis preceding the outbrea k 
39 Butow, Japan's Decision to Sur-render, pp. 130-131. 
40 lbicl, p. 130. 
41 See, in this connection, Baldwin, Great Mistakes of the War, p. 94. For addi-
tional evidence see: William D. Leahy, I Was There (New York: Whittlesey House, 
1950), p. 384; Ernest T. King and Walter M. Whitehall, Fleet Admiral Kin.g (Lo n-
don: Eyre & Spottiswode, 1953), p. 593. 
42 Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, Vol. II, p. 638. 
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of the Six-Day War, it is evident that a clear, coherent and extremely 
menacing perception of threat permeated their thinking and shaped their 
decisions. This vision of threat, which called for vigilance, incorporated 
perceptions of the enemy's capabilities as well as intentions. Thus, the 
enemy was believed to be considering aggressive actions, and to be 
capable of canying them out. 
Unlike the situation on the eve of Pearl Harbor, when American policy 
makers assumed that considerations of "capabilities" would be para-
mount in the thinking of Japan's high policy elite, overshadowing any 
wish or intention to retaliate against American pressures, Israeli policy 
makers in 1967 were impressed with both Arab capabilities and the 
seriousness of their intentions. Thus, whereas Japan ese intentions to 
attack, despite inadequate capabilities to do so, were perceived as 
purely hypothetical, the Egyptian actions of May 1967 convinced Israeli 
policy makers that Arab intentions to destroy Israel could well determine 
their behavior. As Moshe Carmel, Minister of Transportation in the 
1967 Cabinet, recalls: 
. .. one can state definitely that the moves of the Egyptian enemy 
in mid and late May ... caused deep forebodings about the well-
being, security and existence of the State. When I recreate before 
my eyes those fateful meetings and many discussions of the Govern-
ment . . . with all their forebodings, their hesitations and soul-
searching-I have no doubts that everybody saw the ring closing 
before his eyes and the approaching danger to our unstable well-
being, our security and our existence as a free people. In the dis-
cussions we had, the words "danger of destruction" did not pass 
our lips, just as we did not express them in any of the critical pe1iods 
during the past 25 years, not even dming more critical periods than 
those preceding the Six-Day War. No one may have expressed the 
fateful phrase "danger of destruction." Those words were there in 
the air, even if they were not specifically uttered. 43 
The crisis of May 1967 was not perceived by Israeli political leaders 
as an isolated phenomenon, which could be dealt with on its own merits. 
Instead, the chain of events unfolding between May 16 and May 22 
brought to the fore an entire complex of deep-rooted attitudes and 
feelings which can be labelled as the "holocaust syndrome"-the fear 
that the sm-vival of Israel was threatened. 44 Viewing themselves as the 
48 Quoted in Benjamin Geist, "A Question of Survival," International Journal, 
XXVITI (Autumn 1973), pp. 634-635. 
44 Ib id., p. 638. David Danieli, "The Mem01y of the Holocaust as a Factor in 
Crisis" ( Unpublished seminar paper, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1973) 
~Hebrew], passim. See also Brecher's incisive analysis in: Michael Brecher, Decisions 
tn Israel's Foreign Policy (London: Oxford University Press, 1974), p. 333. 
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guardians of the Jewish people at large, and particularly of the survivors 
of the holocaust, members of Israel's high policy elite were acutely sensi-
tive to any threat, however minor, to the security and well-being of their 
state. 45 Living and operating under the searing impact and shadow of 
the destruction of European Jewry, which was further reinforced by the 
long and bitterly fought war of 1948, they adopted the logic inheren t in 
the concept of "worst case analysis" as a guideline. With the memory of 
a complacent and incredulous world-incapable of grasping the b.'ue and 
full meaning of Hitler's threats against the Jewish people-still fresh in 
their minds, Israeli leaders were determined to prevent a second na-
tional catastrophe in their time, and were thus predisposed to take no 
risks when questions of security arose. 
This predisposition to apply to the Arab-Israeli confuct the lessons 
drawn from the traumatic experience of the Second World War, and 
consequently to rega rd any Arab threat as a threat of total annihilati on, 
was readily acknowledged by several decision makers well before the 
crisis leading up to the outbreak of war in 1967. For example, in 1956, 
Shimon Peres ( then Director-General of the Ministry of Defense) stated 
that: 
We, members of the Jewish people, have suffered more than any 
other nation has [during Second World War] and are, there fore, 
acutely sensitive to the appearance of even small Hitlers. It is true 
that Egypt is not Germany and Nass er is not Hitler. Neverthe less, 
the similarity is greater than the difference . 46 
Similarly, on August 26, 1963, Prime Minister Eshkol observed tha t "we 
should not overlook the threats facing us. . . . The danger surroun ding 
the State is that of total destruction ." 47 
On the eve of the Six-Day War and in the face of an explicit Arab 
threat, these floating and sometimes latent feelings and predispositi ons, 
derived from the nation's recent cumulative historical legacy, surface d 
with such vigor and magnitude as to make the analogy with the ex-
termination of European Jewry in the Second World War inescapab le. 
Even on those occasions where decision makers did not directly and 
explicitly resort to the holocaust analogy, it is clear that they operated 
under its deep and indelible imprint. Perceiving danger in the stark 
terms of physical survival, they envisaged defeat as total and complete 
destrnction. 
45 Geist, "A Question of Survival," p. 638. 
46 Danieli, "The Memory of the Holocaust," p. 16. 
47 Ibid. 
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Indeed, so pervasive and all-encompassing was the issue of survival 
in May-June 1967, that it overshadowed any deviant assessments of the 
magnitude of the threat. Specifically, it led Israeli leaders to discount 
the evaluations and convictions of the military elite ( based strictly on 
an assessment of the military balance of power) according to which 
Israel was expected to win any military struggle quickly and decisively. 
Thus, whereas the Army's perspective and frame of reference was focused 
on the events as they unfolded during May 1967 ( and as they affected 
the military balance of power), Israeli policy makers approached the 
crisis with far wider perspective. Clinging to their menacing vision, 
they remained oblivious to the reports and evaluations of the Army's 
high command-which challenged the notion that Israel was confronted 
with a danger of destruction. 
As the then Deputy Chief of Staff, Haim Bar-Lev, has observed in 
retrospect: 
No, there was no danger of destruction on the eve of the Six-Day 
War, and we [i.e., the military] did not speak or think in such 
terms. This danger existed only in the War of Independence and 
it became clear very quickly that, actually, even then, this danger 
was not serious. 48 
The optimism which characterized the thinking of the military elite 
never permeated Israel's high policy elite. Nor did it bring about any 
questioning of the validity of the convictions to which the high policy 
elite tenaciously adhered on the eve of war. Clinging to its preconceived 
notions, this elite drew upon the holocaust analogy as the core of its 
"operational code" and as the impetus for vigilance and irreconcilability. 
Perceptio-ns on the eve of the Yom Kippur War, 1973 
On the eve of the Yorn Kippur war of October 1973, the overall impact 
of the 1967 war dominated strategic thinking in Israel, overshadowing 
any deficiencies or weaknesses manifest during the earlier confrontation, 
or during the subsequent 'War of Attrition." So swift and unequivocal 
was Israel's 1967 victory then, that it had become the model on which 
future military operations were planned and anticipated. As such, the 
Six-Day War had provided an analogy which was later applied "too 
quickly, easily and widely." 49 
Thus, the magnitude of victory in 1967 was the factor which obfuscated 
and diminished the painful memories of the holocaust. Deeply impressed 
by the performance of the Israeli Army during that war, Israeli policy 
48 Geist, "A Question of Survival," p. 641. 
49 See, in this connection, Jervis, Perception and Misperception, p. 220. 
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makers ( most of whom belonged to the group which made decisions in 
1967) realized that they may well have overestimated the magnitu de 
and significance of the Arab threat in 1967. With the "holocaust syn. 
drnme" fading into the background, a new and seemingly more "rationa l" 
perception of the opponent emerged. It was thus assumed that, in light 
of the Egyptian debacle in 1967 and later developments which furthe r 
weakened Egyptian military capability ( e.g., the expulsion of Soviet 
milita1y advisers from Egypt in July 1972), any Egyptian decision to 
wage war would now be based primarily on military consideration rather 
than on nationalistic, ideological or psychological ones. This conviction 
that considerations pertaining to military capabilities alone would dictate 
the opponent's decision to wage war against Israel was clearly expressed 
by Defense Minister Dayan on June 17, 1973: 
As long as there exists an Arab threat, we ought to be ready to 
fight, but it appears to me that more and more they will come to 
realize that they are not going to gain much by waging war . . . . 
Our overall position is much better than in 1967. . . . The past six 
years have fundamentally altered our military situation . The pros-
pect that the Arabs will wage war appears slim to us . . . but even 
if war would break out, we do not believe this would mean a disaster. 
On the contrary, if they were to launch an attack-they would be 
crushed .50 
Overlooking the possibility that their adversaries did not necessarily 
follow the same line of reasoning, Israel's decision makers remained 
unaware of the fact that defeat had not generated a desire for peace on 
the part of the Arab leaders, but rather a lust for revenge. 
Believing the Arabs to have no milita1y option at all, they assumed 
that "there was no logic or rationality whatsoever in believing that Egypt 
could secure any successes, total or partial, by military action ." 51 In 
Perlmutter's words: "Israeli policy makers failed to perceive the willing-
ness of the Egyptian and Syrian leaders to accept high levels of damag e 
in order to change the political status quo the government of Israel 
seemed unprepared to alter." 52 
In the period preceding the Yorn Kippur War, these "rational" assump-
tions were integrated into Israel's political-national security doctiine. 
This doctrine presumed that neither Egypt nor Syria would resort to 
war against Israel without air superiority, or at least without having 
50 Quoted in Ma'ar-iv (Hebrew), June 18, 1973. 
51 The Agranat Report (Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1975), pp. 19-20. 
52 Amos Perlmutter, "Israel's Fourth War, October 1973: Political and Military 
Misperceptions," Orbis, XIX ( Summer 1975), p. 446. 
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enough air power to support her military operations. Since Israel esti-
mated it could maintain its perceived air superiority into the mid-seven-
ties, war was not expected to break out until then. 
The conviction implicit in this doctrine that beaten once by the heat 
of their emotions, Arab leaders would subsequently exhibit caution and 
restraint and thus avoid risks or actions not guided by scrupulous assess-
ments of the military balance of power-affected the Israeli interpreta-
tion of intelligence gathered on the eve of the Yorn Kippur War. During 
the week preceding the war, Israeli intelligence officers of the Southern 
and N orthem Commands amassed credible information indicating an 
impending attack. 
On October 1, for example, intelligence headquarters of the South-
ern Command received a large number of reports indicating unusual 
Egyptian activity along the Suez Canal. On the same day, a lower 
echelon intelligence officer in the Southern Command submitted to his 
Chief Intelligence Officer a memorandum entitled "Activities of the 
Egyptian Armed Forces-The Possibility of Renewal of War." Two 
days later, the same officer presented another memorandum, emphasizing 
the high probability that the Egyptian maneuvers were a mere cover 
for an impending attack. Furthermore, on October 4 aerial photographs 
revealed the deployment of equipment necessary for crossing the Canal, 
as well as massive embankments along the waterway. 58 It was also 
learned that an operation to evacuate Soviet advisers from Egypt and 
Syria had begun on October 3 and was proceeding apace. 
Nevertheless, up to the very eve of war, the accumulated data did not 
affect the strategic thinking of Israel's decision makers. Despite this 
tactical evidence, Israeli policy makers remained committed to their 
belief that Egypt and Syria would avoid a direct challenge, that Israel's 
borders constituted an effective deterrent against a would-be aggressor, 
and that a process of reconciliation rather than war was eventually 
destined to evolve. 
As in the case of American preconceptions on the eve of Pearl Harbor, 
the capability of the enemy to translate impending threats into action 
was not properly assessed. In both cases, while the atmosphere on 
ongoing hostility and tensions indicated serious intentions to attack, it 
was expected that the opponent would not resort to war. 
Unlike their predisposition in 1967 to overestimate the opponent's 
capabilities, and unlike their profound concern that the survival of the 
State was at stake, Israeli decision makers in 1973 watched the un-
53 Ben-Zvi, "Hindsight and Foresight," p. 393; Zeev Schiff, October Earthquak e-
Yom Kippur 1973 (Tel Aviv: University Publishing Projects, 1974), pp. 27-28. 
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precedented deployment of enemy troops along the front with unwave r-
ing confidence. 
Thus there is no trace of fear for the survival of his country in Foreign 
Minister's Eban's speech to the General Assembly on October 3, 1973: 
The international climate is charged with confidence and hope. 
Whatever had divided them in the past , the Israeli and Arab na-
tions cannot escape their common destiny. History and geograp hy 
ensure their proximity. Experience teaches us that there are no 
irreconcilable conflicts. If the Arab Governments will take example 
and inspiration from the prevailing spirit of detente they will find 
in Israel a willing partner for regional development and coopera-
tion.54 
To be sure, several Israeli policy makers at the time did refer to the 
possibility that the Arabs would resort to the military operation. How-
ever, in most statements the threat of war was not perceived as imminent 
or concretely formulated . Rather, it appeared to be an abstract, theore-
tical contingency, which was not expected to dictate short-range Arab 
behavior toward Israel. 
Whereas in 1967 threat was perceived in terms of the physical survival 
of the State, in 1973 the notion of "threat" connoted primarily politi cal 
pressure or, at most, limited and intermittent military action. For 
example, Israel Galili ( Minister without Portfolio ) on April 12, 1973, 
declared that "the danger confronting us is in the attempt to deprive us, 
by means of political actions and occasional military pressure, of the 
vital advantages secured ... following the Six-Day War." 55 Since full-
scale war was considered to be only a remote hypothetical possibility, 
there was little need for vigilance even in the face of tactical evidence 
indicating imminent danger . 
Clearly, the possibility of the Arabs' launching full-scale attack was 
not perceived as viable until the very eve of war. Instead, it was assumed 
that, impressed by Israel's superior military capability , Egypt would 
recognize the futility of war and would ultimately adopt a more con-
ciliatory posture toward settling the Arab-Israeli conflict-a posture 
reflecting the spirit of detente, which was believed to have permeated 
the international environment. 
Indeed, with the lessening of rivalry between the superpowers, it was 
expected that hostility between Israel and the Arabs would also subside. 
The spirit of detente , Israeli policy makers surmised , would frustrate 
54 Quoted in: Israel Policy Statements (Jerusalem : November 14, 1973), pp. l , 15. 
55 Quoted in Abraham Ben-Zvi, "A Comparative Analysis of Four Cases of Sur-
pri se," Int ernational Problems (Hebrew), XV (Autumn 1975), p. 22. 
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Arab political and military ambitions and induce an agreement with 
Israel on terms advantageous to the latter. 56 
Conclusion 
The juxtaposition of American and Israeli perceptions of the opponent 
indicates, first, that decision makers in foreign policy act in accordance 
with their perceptions of reality, not in response to reality itself, and are 
frequently predisposed to misconstrue, distort and deviate from the 
reality of the environment within which they must act. Secondly, the 
analysis demonstrates that events of great magnitude-which can be 
neither ignored nor assimilated into established belief systems-push 
individuals toward major cognitive reorganization. 57 By virtue of their 
iropoitance, dramatic context and proximity , such events clearly expose 
the fallacies inherent in the original perception, and "trigger" decision 
makers to adopt the antithesis of their original conceptions. 58 
Indeed, American policy makers reacted to the trauma of Pearl Harbor 
by adopting a view which in essence contradicted their prewar vision of 
Japan. Similarly, Israeli decision makers, intoxicated by an unexpected, 
overwhelming victory, ultimately abandoned their original and greatly 
threatening image of their opponent, and became complacent and over-
confident in the face of the approaching Arab onslaught. 
So dramatic and drastic were these "trigger events" that they fostered 
dichotomic thinking and encouraged the drawing of oversimplified les-
sons and sweeping generalizations. Thus, after Pearl Harbor, American 
leaders abandoned their visions of the Japanese political elite as a body 
susceptible to reason, adopting instead an equally simplistic notion of 
the Japanese leadership as totally irrational and unaboundedly fanatical. 
Moving in an opposite direction , Israeli leaders shifted from the extreme 
of insecurity and pessimism to the extreme of overconfidence and un-
bounded optimism. 
The predisposition of both American and Israeli policy makers to break 
away from previous preconceptions which were proven erroneous, could 
not in itself guarantee that the gap separating perception from reality 
was to be bridged. Indeed, as the foregoing analysis has indicated, 
breaking away too sharply from past misperceptions can prove as harm-
ful as clinging to those original notions. 
56 Michael I. Handel, Perception, Deception and Surprise: The Case of the Yom 
Kippur War (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Papers on Peace Problems, 1976), pp. 17-18. 
57 See, in this connection, Jervis, "Hypotheses on Misperception," pp. 465-466; 
Jervis. Perception and Misperception, p. 271. 
58 See, in this connection, Touval , Domestic Dyn amics of Change, p. 17. Jervis, 
Perception and Misperception, p. 271. 
